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This policy study asks to what extent large-scale public investment efforts could be a viable 
tool to provide the necessary infrastructure to break Europe’s dependency on fossil fuel and 
carbon emissions more broadly. We estimate semi-structural VAR models for the EU27. 
These are used to study the impact of permanent as well as 5-year long public investment 
programmes. Three key findings emerge: First, government investment multipliers for the 
EU27 are large and range from 5.12 to 5.25. Second, debt-to-GDP ratios are likely to fall in 
response to the strong economic impulse generated by additional public investment spending. 
The study therefore classifies additional public investment spending in the EU27 as 
sustainable fiscal policy. Third, single country investment initiatives will likely lead to smaller 
economic expansions when compared to coordinated EU-wide investment, due to Europe’s 
strong intra-member state trade flows. A coordinated approach to fiscal policy is thus 
substantially more effective not only when it comes to delivering network-dependent 
infrastructure (rail, grid) but also with respect to the economic stimulus it creates. 
 







While investment in the future carries positive connotations, the narrative changes abruptly when the 
conversation shifts to public investment projects. The costs and the potentially associated increase in 
public debt are then emphasised, and the latter is framed as “a burden on future generations”.2 This 
rather negative perception of public debt resulting from bold investment initiatives lies in stark 
contrast to the lack of green infrastructure needed for a credible transformation of Europe into a 
carbon-neutral society. The last two decades have shown that private sector investment will not 
suffice to provide the necessary infrastructure – an upgraded and integrated grid, wind and solar 
electricity generation, efficient public transport as an alternative to cars and air travel, improved 
energy efficiency in the existing building stock, to name just a few key areas. While the European 
Commission acknowledges the need for public investment, and also provides some funding via the 
Next Generation EU recovery fund, nevertheless, the scale of this funding remains well below what 
is realistically needed. For example, the Recovery and Resilience Facility, which constitutes the heart 
of the Next Generation EU fund, amounts to €85 billion annually over a decade. In contrast, Wildauer 
et al (2020) estimate that to adhere to the Paris agreement credibly, the EU27 requires additional 
investment spending of €855 billion annually, excluding the transport sector. The European 
Commission estimates that upgrading the existing building stock to a net-zero standard would require 
additional investment of almost €500 billion annually (European Commission 2019). Nevertheless, in 
its recent proposals, the Commission is confident that the private sector will do the heavy lifting when 
it comes to (infrastructure) investment (European Commission 2021a). The Commission’s Fit for 55 
proposals, which provide the legal and regulatory basis for implementing the Green Deal, focus 
heavily on providing the correct incentives and price signals via expanding and reforming the 
emissions trading system (ETS) (European Commission 2021b). The assumption being that the new 
combination of incentives and pricing of externalities should bring private sector activity in line with a 
carbon neutral economy. Given the poor performance of this ‘incentive approach’ in the past and 
given that critical infrastructure like the energy grid or international high-speed rail network requires 
cross-border coordination unlikely to be achieved by individual private companies, the question arises 
as to why the public sector is not actively pursuing this infrastructure investment itself? With the 
world running out of time in its fight against climate change, as pointed out by the latest 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, it is not clear why waiting for the private 
sector to respond to price signals is the best approach for tackling climate change. A crisis situation 
requires serious consideration of all the available options. One of these is direct public sector 
 
2 For example, by the former German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble: “Europe’s social peace requires a 
return to fiscal discipline”, Financial Times, 2 June 2021. 
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provision, which would allow the EU and its member states to make the necessary investment 
quickly and at the ambitious scale required.  
However, an ambitious public investment initiative to tackle the climate crisis is often perceived as 
incompatible with a ‘prudent’ or ‘responsible’ approach to macroeconomic policymaking, and most 
notably to fiscal policymaking, unless paired with substantial increases in government revenues. Yet 
while there is some potential for increasing taxes without jeopardising recovery from the Covid-19 
pandemic (Kapeller et al 2021), delivering the required infrastructure without any debt-financed 
public investment spending seems unrealistic. Against this background of the climate crisis and 
Europe’s infrastructure needs, there is thus a need to reassess what constitutes ‘responsible’ fiscal 
policy. Our policy study therefore sets out to estimate the long-term effects of a publicly funded 
investment initiative on the public finances of the EU27. In essence, our study connects investment in 
sustainable infrastructure with the sustainability of government debt. Our policy study estimates the 
impact that a public investment initiative to shape the climate transition is likely to have on the 
overall economy and economic growth and thereby also considers the second-round effects on 
government budgets and public debt. These effects are extremely important given that economic 
activity has a direct and immediate impact on public finances. Government revenues such as VAT or 
income tax vary with economic activity, as does government expenditure on areas such as 
unemployment support and training. Our approach allows us to estimate the long-term impact of a 
public investment initiative on GDP and public debt levels given that these contribute to the 
assessment of the viability of such an initiative for the fight against climate change. The remainder 
of our policy study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of fiscal policy and how 
to judge its sustainability. Section 3 discusses Europe’s green investment gap and how it can be 
measured. Section 4 describes the method and empirical approach. Section 5 presents the results, and 
Section 6 concludes. 
2 Sustainable fiscal policy 
While most economists agree that a fiscally sustainable government ought to avoid defaulting on 
its debt, judging whether public finances are in line with this aim is less straightforward. One reason 
is that there is some empirical uncertainty about how to value publicly owned assets (which makes it 
difficult to compare debt with gross wealth in the public sector) as well as about the determinants of 
long-term developments in public finances (which casts doubt on the simple extrapolation of current 
trends). Another reason is that the answer will also depend on the prevailing institutional 
characteristics and on the assumptions that we are willing to make regarding the exact functioning of 
these institutions. For instance, economists such as Kelton (2020) argue that governments which take 
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on debt in their own currency and can rely on their central bank’s support face no risk of bankruptcy 
whatsoever. However, given that the European Central Bank (ECB) is not mandated with preventing 
its members from defaulting, Kelton’s argument does not directly apply to the eurozone in its current 
form. Acknowledging the possibility of default therefore, the question of what constitutes sustainable 
fiscal policy in Europe thus remains a matter of debate and of ongoing research among 
macroeconomists.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of real government debt and real GDP for the EU27 based on quarterly 
data from 2000 Q1 to 2020 Q4, both deflated with the GDP deflator.  Two events characterise the 
evolution of the European economy over the past two decades: the financial crisis of 2008-09 and 
ensuing sovereign debt crisis; and the Covid crisis of 2020. In the former event, government liabilities 
started to climb strongly in the fourth quarter of 2008. Initially the increase was mainly due to the 
economic stimulus packages but as the financial crisis deepened, rescue packages for failing financial 
institutions and a slowing recovery due to over-eager fiscal consolidations drove public borrowing up 
further. More recently, the historically unprecedented size of the Covid recession and its related 
economic support measures have led to a sharp rise in public sector borrowing since the second 
quarter of 2020, when GDP collapsed due to the lockdowns imposed to contain the virus. 
Based on Figure 1 alone, any judgement regarding the extent to which European governments 
pursued ‘responsible’ fiscal policy is impossible. Three standard approaches for evaluating fiscal 
policy are discussed in the macroeconomic literature (Ramey 2019). First, fiscal sustainability can be 
evaluated by taking the total amount of outstanding government debt (per capita) as the basis. The 
EU27’s nominal government liabilities stood at €10.8 trillion in 2019 before rising to €12.1 trillion in 
2020 in response to the Covid recession. These liabilities amount to a debt level of €24,200 and 
€27,000 per capita respectively.3 However, numbers like these are not very informative by 
themselves. Focusing solely on government liabilities without considering public assets is thus the first 
shortcoming of this approach, as it only considers one part of the relevant balance sheet. Indeed, such 
an approach is effectively akin to asking whether a company with €100 million in outstanding liabilities 
is overly indebted. Without taking the asset side of the company’s balance sheet into account, this is 
a rather meaningless question. In addition, government revenues out of which these debts are 
serviced are closely tied to the size of the economy, which may again depend on the size of the public 
sector. The interaction between the development of the public sector and overall economic 
 
3 Based on Eurostat data on general government gross consolidated debt (Eurostat table gov_10dd_edpt1) and 
population data (Eurostat table demo_pjan). 
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development must therefore be taken into account explicitly. Overall, absolute levels of (per capita) 
government debt do not provide a sound basis to judge fiscal sustainability. 
Figure 1: Real government debt and real GDP in the EU27 
 
Second, fiscal sustainability can be evaluated by invoking arbitrary thresholds, as in the case of the 
Maastricht criteria or Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) once famous but now discredited (Herndon et al 
2013) argument on how debt will stifle growth if it grows larger than 90% of current GDP. According 
to the Maastricht criteria, which are the cornerstone of the eurozone’s fiscal framework, governments 
should aim to keep deficits below 3% of GDP and the debt-to-GDP level below 60%. However, there is 
hardly any robust empirical basis on which politicians can rely when choosing deficit or debt targets. 
Such targets are largely arbitrary, and adherence to them is very likely to act procyclically as well as to 
have the potential to worsen governments’ financial positions if economic downturns are prolonged 
due to premature fiscal tightening (Truger 2013, Heimberger and Kapeller 2017). This implies that 
governments adhering to budgetary rules such as the Maastricht criteria cannot be considered a valid 
assessment of the fiscal responsibility of governments. 
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Third, fiscal sustainability can be evaluated by model-based assessments of fiscal policy. The 
simplest form is potentially the following law of motion for government debt:4 
∆𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = (𝑒𝑒 − 𝑡𝑡) + (𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  (1) 
where ∆𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 is the change in the government debt-to-GDP ratio, (𝑒𝑒 − 𝑡𝑡) is the difference between 
government primary expenditure and revenues in percent of GDP (primary budget balance), (𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔) 
is the difference between the average nominal interest on government debt and the nominal growth 
rate of the economy, and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 is the current debt-to-GDP ratio. The first important takeaway arising 
from this law of motion is that the debt-to-GDP ratio will depend not only on the government’s 
decision on taxation and expenditure (𝑒𝑒 − 𝑡𝑡) but also on how well the overall economy is doing and 
the interest rate a government has to pay on its liabilities (𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔). Additionally, it matters how 
indebted the country already is (𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡). This means if the economy grows strongly (high 𝑔𝑔) and/or interest 
rates are very low, potentially at the zero lower bound, budget deficits might still be compatible with 
a stable or even declining debt-to-GDP ratio. However, this equation (1) ignores the impact of fiscal 
policy (𝑒𝑒 − 𝑡𝑡) on the growth rate of the economy (𝑔𝑔). This is often motivated by the assumption that 
economic growth in the long term is not driven by aggregate demand and thus fiscal policy has no 
impact on it. While this assumption is questionable in general, even limiting fiscal policy only to short- 
and medium-term effects makes this law of motion unsuitable to track the budgetary impact of 
spending decisions because it ignores an important interaction between spending (e), taxation (t), and 
successive growth (g). Equation (1) can thus at best serve as a crude long- run rule of thumb which 
ignores crucial short- and medium-term effects.  
Given that there are problems associated with all three approaches, our policy study abandons the 
search for an optimal fiscal policy rule or target, and instead starts from the simple principle that 
public sector spending will result in one of three outcomes for the public debt-to-GDP ratio – it will 
either rise, fall or remain constant. We regard a falling or unchanged debt ratio as sustainable 
conduct of fiscal policy. However, assessing whether an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
sustainable is different from asking whether it is desirable, as desirability requires a careful 
consideration of the benefits and costs. A debt ratio that fares worse in terms of sustainability may 
still be desirable if it leads to a substantial reduction in carbon emissions. Making this judgement call 
is ultimately a political and not an economic question. 
The response of the public debt-to-GDP ratio to public (investment) spending can be understood as 
the effect that each euro of public investment has on both public debt and GDP (multiplier) over the 
period in question. As most theoretical approaches have difficulty in tracking this independently, we 
 
4 A derivation of Equation (1) can be found in the technical appendix. 
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resort in this policy study to an empirical approach that looks at the net effects of additional public 
investment, as discernible from past data. Ultimately, estimating the impact of government 
investment spending on the economy and on public finances comes down to a careful estimate of 
fiscal multipliers. Although fiscal multiplier research began to fall out of favour amongst most 
economists since the 1970s, research on fiscal policy in general, and fiscal multipliers in particular, has 
seen renewed interest since the onset of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and ensuing European 
debt crisis. Since the focus of this policy study is on statistical estimation, in contrast to the simulation 
of theoretical models, we present a brief summary of the empirical literature on fiscal multipliers.  
Gechert (2015) provides a meta-regression analysis of 104 fiscal multiplier studies and surveys a wide 
variety of empirical and theoretical model classes. However, in what follows we only consider the 
surveyed results from the statistically estimated models. Gechert’s key findings are: i) different 
techniques used for estimating, modelling or simulating a given fiscal policy may yield highly 
contrasting results; ii) public investment multipliers have the largest impulse out of all the fiscal 
policies surveyed, with the average investment-GDP multiplier between 1.4 and 2.1 for empirical 
studies; (iii) international trading relationships affect the multiplier: regions with higher import shares 
have lower public expenditure multipliers; and (iv) general public expenditure multipliers are higher 
than those obtained from tax cuts and increasing transfers.5 Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) for their 
part estimate the effects of coordinated fiscal actions across the eurozone in contrast with actions of 
equal magnitude taken by individual member states. Their research finds that coordinated actions 
have a greater impact in comparison to member states acting in isolation – which is well in line with 
the overall observation that multipliers depend on import propensities.  
In summary, the magnitude of a given public investment multiplier depends on a variety of factors 
such as openness to trade, the proximity of the central bank policy rate to the zero lower bound, 
the extent to which fiscal policy action is coordinated multilaterally between neighbouring states, 
the phase of the business and asset price cycles, the level of public indebtedness and perceived 
creditworthiness, and the interaction of these variables. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2017) find 
that increased government spending does not necessarily lead to worsening public debt ratios or 
increased financing costs for developed countries even when initial debt ratios are high. Moreover, 
they report that increases in public spending may serve to improve fiscal sustainability during times 
 
5 In addition, Auerbach et al (2012) find that public expenditure multipliers are stronger during recessions than 
in economic expansions. The authors estimate public investment multipliers of 2.27 (expansion), 3.42 
(recession), and 2.39 (combined) for the USA (1947 Q1-2008 Q4). 
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of sluggish growth. However, they also acknowledge that there are limits to borrowing and that not 
all countries are endowed with the same degree of latitude by creditors. 
3 Green investment gap and data 
The European Union currently lacks the infrastructure required to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions quickly and substantially and to reach the goal of limiting global warming this century to 
well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. This lack of infrastructure can be seen in an energy 
grid which is not capable of transferring excess wind and solar energy created in some parts of the 
European Union to other parts which need additional reserves (Grams et al 2017). More 
fundamentally, the EU27 lacks wind and solar power generating capacity (Cherp et al 2021). In 
addition, other areas which require major investment are public transport alternatives to air travel, as 
well as a reduction of the carbon footprint of buildings (European Commission 2019). Overall, the 
European Commission itself estimates that additional investment expenditure of €350 billion annually 
(European Commission 2021a) is needed to tackle climate change. Wildauer et al (2020) estimate that 
the Commission’s assessment is most likely a grave underestimation of the true investment 
requirements. The Commissions own research shows that making Europe’s buildings energy efficient 
by 2050 will involve a threefold increase in current insulation and heat pump installation efforts, 
requiring an estimated €490 billion annually (European Commission 2019). Currently the electricity 
sector6 renews and replaces about 4% of its gross capital stock annually. Increasing this rate to 9% a 
year, and thus more than doubling current efforts in order to establish a sustainable electricity 
infrastructure, will require additional investment expenditure of €84 billion annually (Wildauer et al 
2020: 25). The investment requirements of the industrial sector7 are extremely difficult to assess but 
simply increasing the investment rate by three percentage points of the existing capital stock from the 
current 8% would require additional annual investments of €80 billion (ibid). Furthermore, since many 
zero carbon technologies do not exist yet or are not yet ready for large-scale application, a substantial 
increase in research and development (R&D) expenditure is most likely needed. The Europe 2020 
Strategy,8 announced in 2010, included a goal to spend 3% of GDP on research and development as 
part of the EU’s long-term economic strategy. However, the EU has failed to achieve this. Reaching 
this 3% R&D goal would require an increase in spending of €75 billion annually, while increasing the 
goal to 4% would require €201 billion in additional research spending each year (ibid). Taken together 
 
6 Sector D in NACE Rev. 2. 
7 Sector B and C in NACE Rev. 2. 
8 European Commission (2010). 
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this amounts to additional investment expenditure of €855 billion per year – and it does not include 
the transport sector.9 
Table 1: Gross fixed capital formation data 
Breakdown Subclasses Availability 
by sector S11 Non-financial corporations 
S12 Financial corporations 
S13 General government 
S14 Households 
S15 Non-profit institutions serving households 
S2 Rest of the world 
annually [nasa_10_nf_tr] 
quarterly [nasq_10_nf_tr] 






AN.112 Other buildings and structures 
AN.113 Machinery and equipment 
AN.114 Weapons systems 
AN.115 Cultivated biological resources 
AN.116 Costs of ownership transfer on non-
produced assets 
AN.117 Intellectual property products 
annually [nama_10_an6] 
quarterly [namq_10_an6] 





A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
B Mining and quarrying 
C Manufacturing 






Cross tabulation for industry by asset cells annually [nama_10_nfa_fl] 
 
The most comprehensive source of data on investment spending in an economy (gross fixed capital 
formation, GFCF) is the national accounts. In the case of the European Union, these are compiled by 
the national statistical agencies and distributed by Eurostat. There are at least three dimensions along 
which GFCF data can be disaggregated – by sector, by assets and by industry. Disaggregation by sector 
sheds light on who incurred the investment expenditure and allows a distinction between the public 
sector, firms, households, and entities in other countries (see Table 1). Disaggregation by industry 
provides a different angle on the same question and sheds light on the industry which undertook the 
investment project. Industry classifications are based on the EU’s Statistical Classification of Economic 
Activities in the European Community (NACE), which distinguishes between activities according to a 
rough categorisation of the final products produced by different industries (Table 1). This 
 
9 See Wildauer et al (2020) for details, Table 8 for an overview. 
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categorisation is typically available for different levels of granularity. Thirdly, disaggregation by asset 
sheds light on what kind of investment project was undertaken and distinguishes between 
investment in categories such as dwellings (residential buildings), other buildings and structures 
(offices, government buildings, schools and bridges, railways etc) and machinery and equipment (see 
Table 1). Cross tabulations, where GFCF data is disaggregated along the lines of two or more of the 
above categories at the same time, are only available on an annual basis and only for an industry-asset 
breakdown.  
Against this background it becomes clear that the direct identification of green public investment in 
national accounts data is difficult because of the lack of a quarterly cross tabulation of GFCF data by 
sector and by industry. Cross tabulation by industry would ideally be down to NACE level 3 precision. 
Moreover, some information on the more specific purpose of the investment (eg, whether 
construction expenditure is for the expansion or insulation of existing buildings) is not collected in 
national accounts. It cannot therefore be determined from the quarterly data whether a given amount 
of public investment has been spent on installing wind turbines, building a coal power plant, or on 
some other combination. We are thus forced to assume that one euro of government investment in 
green infrastructure will have the same economic impact as one euro of government investment of 
the average type prevailing over the last two decades. Obviously investing in wind vs investing in coal 
would have a fundamentally different impact on Europe’s ability to meet its climate targets. However, 
since our policy report is dedicated to exploring the impact of green infrastructure investment on 
economic activity and public finances and not emissions, we consider that this assumption (of one 
euro spent on green infrastructure having the same impact as one euro of government investment of 
the average type over the last two decades) is a meaningful way to overcome the existing data 
limitations. Indeed, it should be noted that other recent contributions in the literature are forced to 
adopt very similar assumptions. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
for example published an extensive report in 2017 about public investment in the context of the 
climate transition (OECD 2017). The two models the OECD used for its predictions (YODA and GEM) 
were simply based on general public investment without any distinction between green and other 
infrastructure (YODA). The GEM model distinguishes between investment in different sectors, 
especially in the oil and gas sector – but is unable to distinguish between public and private actors. 
Despite the discussed shortcomings, the national accounts data we use in this policy study provide a 
fully representative picture not only of the overall economy but also of the government sector. This is 
a clear advantage compared to non-representative data (eg, from industry bodies or non-
representative surveys). The national accounts data therefore allow us to draw conclusions about 
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government investment spending that are representative at the EU and national member state 
level, and that can thus inform policymaking decisions. 
4 Estimating fiscal multipliers 
In order to quantify the long-run effects of government investment on the economy and public 
finances we estimate semi-structural vector autoregressions (VARs) of the following form: 
𝐵𝐵0𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑚𝑚1𝑡𝑡 + � 𝑚𝑚2,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝐵𝐵1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 
(1) 
where for Model A, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is a vector consisting of real government investment spending (GINV) and real 
gross domestic product (GDP), both measured in billion euros. For Model B we also add the real stock 
of government debt (GDEBT) to the system. Similar models are widely used in the literature to model 
the effects of monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Christiano et al 1996; ibid 2005; Uhlig 
2005) and oil price shocks (Edelstein and Kilian 2009).  A detailed description of the data and the 
methodological approach of our study can be found in the technical appendix. Most importantly, the 
crucial assumption of our analysis is that government investment spending takes more than one 
quarter to be implemented and thus within a quarter there is no feedback from the other variables 
in the system (GDP and GDEBT) on public investment. Given that large-scale investment projects do 
not only involve a substantial planning effort but often also require additional legislation, this is a 
standard assumption in the empirical literature on fiscal multipliers and has been widely used since 
being popularised by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). It is especially suitable for identifying exogenous 
movements in government investment spending. The second crucial assumption we make is that the 
financial crisis and the euro crisis were disruptions of historic proportions which cannot be 
sufficiently explained by normal business cycle fluctuations. Since the focus of our policy study is on 
the conduct of fiscal policy and not on the question of how financial crises and bubbles form, we have 
modelled these events as exogenous. To do this, we used the so-called step-indicator approach of 
Castle et al (2015). Full details of this can be found in the technical appendix. 
Within this framework we start out in Section 5.1 by estimating the effects on GDP and public debt of 
a permanent increase in government investment spending. To do this we use so-called orthogonalised 
cumulative impulse response functions (CIRFs) and long-run multipliers (LRMs).10 CIRFs allow us to 
quantify the response of GDP, public debt and government investment to an increase in government 
investment. LRMs go one step further and allow us to judge how strong the response of GDP is in 
relation to the investment impulse by calculating the ratio of the cumulative deviation of GDP from 
 
10 Also called cumulative multipliers. 
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the baseline trajectory relative to the additional public investment spending due to the assumed 
permanent increase in government spending. In Section 5.2 we address the slightly different question 
of the effect on GDP and public debt, if government investment increases by a certain amount for a 
given period, instead of permanently. We use what we call orthogonalised semi-permanent impulse 
response functions (SPIRFs) to provide an answer to this question.11 SPIRFs allow us to track the 
adjustment of the economy to a sustained increase in government spending which lasts for a given 
period (eg, five years) and then falls back to the baseline trajectory. Finally, in Section 5.3, we use our 
model and our dataset to quantify the difference between a coordinated and an uncoordinated 
approach to public investment. Since we observe our time series of public investment, GDP and public 
debt at the aggregate level for the EU27 as well as at the individual country level, we can re-estimate 
our model separately for each EU member country. The LRMs from these individual country models 
are based on variations in fiscal policy of that country only. By contrast, the LRMs from the EU27 model 
are based on variations in fiscal policy across all member countries. Comparing the differences 
between these two sets of results provides insights into the difference between coordinated and 
uncoordinated fiscal policy and thereby answers the question of whether and to what extent 
organising a joint effort among the EU27 will make a difference in terms of achievable outcomes. 
5 The long-term effects of a European investment initiative 
This section provides estimates of the long-term effects of exogenous changes in government 
investment spending. Such exogenous changes are called shocks in the scientific literature on fiscal 
policy. Specifically, we are interested in the effects of an exogenous investment shock on economic 
growth, the government budget, and the level of government debt. An exogenous investment shock 
in this context means that we are looking at the effects of changes in government investment spending 
which cannot be explained by the past and current trajectory of the economy (GDP), government debt 
(GDEBT) or government investment (GINV) itself. We therefore interpret these shocks as active 
decisions by policymakers to increase or reduce government investment spending. A detailed 
methodological discussion on this can be found in the technical appendix. 
5.1 Permanent or long-run effects of government investment 
Our analysis starts with a scenario in which a government implements an initial increase in public 
investment spending of €100 billion above its baseline trajectory. The baseline trajectory is the 
trajectory of the economy without an exogenous increase in public investment. We are interested in 
the effect of this initial €100 billion investment on output and government finances. The two vector 
 
11 We define SPIRFs in the appendix. They consist of CIRFs up to year five and then we trace the adjustment 
back to the baseline after year five, which is when the exogenous investment impulse recedes. 
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autoregressive (VAR) models we use for the EU27 allow us to see this effect in the form of 
orthogonalised cumulative impulse response functions (CIRFs), shown in Figure 2. Starting with 
Model A (left-hand column of Figure 2), an initial increase in government investment (GINV, yellow 
graph, upper left of Figure 2) of €100 billion beyond the baseline leads to a slow increase in investment 
spending, which reaches €526 billion 12 years after the initial impulse. The reason for this gradual 
increase in investment spending beyond the initial €100 billion is that, as stated earlier, investment 
projects take time to implement and most public investment projects are not finished within one 
quarter. The long-run effect of €526 billion (dashed line) represents the total increase in investment 
spending over 12 years. That means based on Model A, roughly 20% of an investment project is 
therefore spent in the first quarter and the remaining 80% is spent over the next decade.12 To 
provide some context, public investment spending across the EU27 amounted to €404 billion in 
2019.13 The scenario analysed with Model A thus represents an initial boost of 25% of public 
investment spending, which grows into more than double (+ 132%) the EU27 public investment 
spending beyond the baseline trajectory ten years after the initial impulse. The lower left graph in 
Figure 2 shows the response of GDP to such a public investment impulse. As investment spending 
increases gradually over time, so does GDP. While the immediate impact is quite small (€57 billion 
above baseline on impact), the economy expands strongly until GDP reaches an expansion of €2,763 
billion (long-run effect, dashed line) beyond the baseline trajectory 12 years after the initial 
investment impulse.  
Model A therefore predicts a strong economic expansion triggered by additional public investment 
spending. Both the investment responses and those of GDP are statistically significant at the 10% 
level since the confidence band, represented by the shaded area, does not include the zero line. While 
Model A does not explicitly take the government budget into account, the strong expansion of GDP 
suggests that increasing public investment does not lead to any medium- or long-term problems for 
public finances. On the contrary, the stronger economic activity is likely to reduce public costs 





12 €100 billion is roughly 20% of €526 billion. 
13 Based on seasonally adjusted data. 
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Figure 2: Long-run effects of investment spending 
Model A Model B 
  
Solid lines represent CIRFS to a €100 billion increase in GINV in year 0. Dashed lines represent the long-run effect, 
and shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals. Responses are depicted as deviations from the baseline 
trajectories. 
While the results discussed thus far already provide an idea of the relative size of the investment 
impulse and the expansion of the economy, it is nevertheless also useful to compare the volume of 
additional output to the volume of investment spending that leads to this output expansion. A 
systematic way of carrying out such a comparison is to compute long-run multipliers (LRMs) by 
dividing the increase in GDP x years after the initial investment impulse by the increase in investment 
x years after the initial increase. These long-run multipliers are reported in Table 2. On impact, which 
is the quarter in which government investment starts to increase, the multiplier is about 0.56 in both 
models, which means that in the first quarter additional government investment of one euro would 
lead to an increase in GDP of €0.56. After one year the multiplier is 4.15 and 2.7 respectively and after 
ten years, the multiplier is 5.25 in Model A and 5.12 in Model B. Ten years after increasing 
government investment permanently, each additional euro spent on government investment 
therefore leads to an increase in GDP of €5.25 and €5.12 respectively.  
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Table 2: Long-run multipliers (LRMs) 
Horizon Model A Model B 
Impact 0.57 0.56 
1 year 4.15 2.70 
5 years 5.18 4.62 
10 years 5.25 5.12 
LRMs are calculated as the ratio of the GDP deviation x years 
after the investment impulse, relative to the GINV deviation x 
years after the impulse. 
These multipliers are just another way of looking at the results presented in Figure 2 and they 
emphasise how powerful public investment can be in stimulating the economy. These large effects 
warrant three comments. Firstly, the results are highly robust across both models. Meaningful 
differences only occur in the short term, specifically in the first year of the shock. Secondly, these 
multiplier estimates are well in line with previous results in the empirical and theoretical literature. 
Baxter and King (1993), for example, show that investment multipliers can be as high as seven in a 
theoretical model, and Leduc and Wilson (2012) report peak multipliers of eight for the USA. Benetrix 
and Lane (2009) find investment multipliers between 2.3 and 3.7 in a panel of 11 European countries, 
which is the same range reported by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) for the USA. Thirdly, the 
fact that we obtain large GDP multipliers explains why public debt does not increase in response to 
higher public spending. As pointed out previously, a large economic expansion in response to 
additional government investment will reduce government expenditure and increase revenues. A 
large economic expansion will thus improve public finances compared with a baseline scenario 
without additional government spending.  
5.2 A five-year green investment initiative 
The pressing political question at hand is not so much about the effects of a permanent increase in 
government spending, but rather about the effects of a sustained investment initiative which is 
focused on delivering transformative infrastructure for a prolonged period. This section of our policy 
study therefore estimates the effects of a sustained five-year public investment initiative using 
orthogonalised semi-permanent impulse response functions (SPIRFs).14 Figure 3 displays the SPIRFs 
for GDP, government investment (GINV) and the budget balance based on Model A. We have scaled 
the investment impulse so that over the entire 12-year period of Figure 3, investment of €10 trillion 
(€10,406 billion) beyond the baseline is undertaken. This corresponds to €800 billion annually over 
12 years. This latter amount represents roughly the additional investment requirement for a green 
transition estimated in earlier work (Wildauer et al 2020). The yellow line in Figure 3 represents the 
 
14 A precise definition can be found in the technical appendix. 
16 
 
investment SPIRF. The line increases gradually because implementing investment projects takes time, 
and the associated expenses occur over several years. The same mechanism explains why investment 
spending does not immediately drop back to the baseline (the zero line) after five years. In other 
words, while no new projects are started after five years, the existing ones take time to be completed 
and require outlay over the following years. From year five onwards we therefore see a gradual decline 
in investment spending above the baseline trajectory. Over the entire 12-year period, public 
investment (GINV) increases by €10,406 billion above the baseline trajectory, with €6,958 billion of 
this occurring over the first five years. 
The purple line in Figure 3 depicts the GDP response to such a semi-permanent increase in public 
investment. The economy expands strongly over the first five years, before then returning gradually 
to the baseline trajectory. Over the entire 12-year period, additional output of €54,625 billion is 
realised due to the investment stimulus. This healthy expansion is logical given that in the previous 
section we saw Model A implying a long-run multiplier of more than five. While Model A, on which 
Figure 3 is based, does not include government debt or government finances directly, we have 
calculated an implied budget balance by assuming that government revenues are constant at 30% 
of GDP and by assuming that government expenditure other than public investment remains 
unaffected (which means ignoring positive second-round effects due to lower social security spending 
in an economic boom). The change in the budget balance, depicted as a green line in Figure 3, is then 
obtained as revenues (30% of the GDP trajectory) minus expenditure (the cost of public investment 
spending). This is expressed in Equation (2). 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 3 = 0.3 ∙  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 (2) 
In Figure 3 we see that the budget balance improves strongly. At its peak after five years it implies a 
reduction in the stock of government debt by €2,982 billion. After 12 years this amount grows to 
€5,956 billion. This means that a sustained public investment initiative has the potential to decrease 
the stock of public debt due to the strong economic expansion that the investment triggers. The 
additional revenues due to the economic boom outweigh the costs, and the budget balance improves 
compared with a baseline scenario in which no additional investment spending occurs. Within the first 
five years the investment impulse generates additional government revenues which are 1.4 times the 
volume of the additional investment spending. After 12 years this increases to 1.6 times the 
investment impulse. Within the framework of Model A, which assumes that government revenues are 
a fixed rate of 30% of GDP, we obtain the result that a sustained government investment initiative 
would not only have a strong growth effect but would also lead to falling government debt in the long 
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run. According to our criterion from Section 2, a sustained five-year public investment initiative 
would lead to falling debt-to-GDP ratios and would therefore constitute responsible fiscal policy. 
Figure 3: Semi-permanent IRF model A 
Figure 4 shows the orthogonalised semi-permanent impulse response functions (SPIRFs) for the EU27 
economy to a sustained five-year public investment impulse based on Model B, which directly 
incorporates the stock of government debt. For ease of comparability, we have transformed the 
response of the stock of debt into the budget balance by simply looking at the negative change of the 
debt stock as expressed in Equation (3). In this way an increase in the stock of debt shows up as a 
negative budget balance (deficit) and a decrease in the stock of debt is depicted as a positive budget 
balance (surplus). 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 4 = 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1−𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 (3) 
As in Figure 3, we have rescaled the five-year investment impulse in Figure 4 so that additional 
government investment of €10 trillion is undertaken over the entire period. On average, this amounts 
to €800 billion annually. As was the case with Model A, we obtain a sizeable economic expansion in 
response to the additional government investment spending from the SPIRF of Model B. This result is 
logical, given the large multipliers we have found for both models (Table 2). The key difference 
between Model A and Model B is that in the latter the implied budgetary effects are much smaller. 
This is in line with the fact that the long-run cumulative IRFs for the government debt stock for Model 
B are not statistically different from zero. On the basis of Model B, we should thus expect a minor 
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improvement in government finances over the entire period of Figure 4 in response to the expansion 
of public investment spending. After 12 years, government liabilities would be €890 billion lower 
compared with a situation in which there is no additional government investment spending.  This 
means that, like Model A, Model B predicts sharply falling debt-to-GDP ratios in response to a five-
year public investment initiative, allowing us to label the investment initiative clearly as fiscally 
sustainable and thus as sustainable fiscal policy, according to our simple criterion of stable or falling 
debt ratios for sustainable fiscal policy. 
Figure 4: Semi-permanent IRF model B 
 
5.3 Coordinated vs uncoordinated fiscal efforts 
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 we estimated Models A and B with aggregate data for the EU27. An extremely 
relevant policy issue in the European context is to understand the potential benefits of coordinated 
fiscal action compared with isolated or uncoordinated initiatives. The European Union and the 
eurozone represent a highly integrated economy with large cross-border trade flows. While this makes 
the European Union similar to large and highly integrated (nation) states like the USA, the key 
institutional difference is that fiscal policy is mainly carried out at the federal level in the USA but at 
the state level in the EU. An EU-wide fiscal impulse of the order of magnitude discussed above, 
requires substantial political coordination between member states. In order to help achieve such 
coordination a clear understanding is needed of the benefits of coordinated action and the costs of 
coordination failures.  
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In Table 3 we compare the long-run multipliers from Model A for the EU27 with averaged long-run 
multipliers obtained from estimating Model A for each of the 27 member countries. Column (1) in 
Table 3 reproduces the long-run multiplier for the EU27 from Section 5.1, which we will interpret as a 
measure of coordinated fiscal policy since it is estimated from variations in government investment 
spending across the EU27. Column (2) of Table 3 contains a GDP-weighted average over 20 EU country-
specific long-run multipliers that we obtained from the single country models.15 We interpret these as 
a measure of the effectiveness of uncoordinated fiscal policy since they are obtained from variations 
in individual country investment spending only. The averaging of the individual country results allows 
us to condense the 20 country-specific multipliers into a single number which we can readily compare 
with the coordinated fiscal policy baseline in column (1). Lastly, column (3) of Table 3 contains a long-
run multiplier which is obtained by aggregating the GDP and investment responses across all 20 
countries before calculating the multiplier as the ratio of the two. Full details of this can be found in 
the technical appendix. We also interpret this as a measure of the effectiveness of uncoordinated 
fiscal policy since the individual country results are based on country-specific investment variations. 
Column (2) and column (3) therefore simply represent different ways of summarising the results for 
20 individual countries in a single multiplier, which we can compare with the coordinated fiscal policy 
case based on aggregate EU27 data. 
Table 3: Investment multipliers (Model A) 
 (1) (2) (3) 






Individual country investment 
impulse  
(aggregated marginal effects) 
Impact 0.57 1.13 0.51 
1 year 4.15 2.99 2.37 
5 years 5.18 3.64 3.90 
10 years 5.25 3.71 4.14 
 
The picture which emerges from Table 3 is that firstly the differences between the two aggregation 
methods are minor. On impact the GDP-weighted average yields a multiplier of 1.13 and the multiplier 
based on aggregated deviations from the baseline is 0.51. However, this gap closes at the five- and 
ten-year horizon. Importantly, the following conclusions about the differences between coordinated 
and uncoordinated fiscal policy do not depend on the aggregation method. Secondly, the 
uncoordinated fiscal policy multipliers in columns (2) and (3) are consistently smaller than the 
multipliers based on simultaneous or coordinated government investment impulses reported in 
 
15 We excluded seven countries from the average because they failed to pass standard statistical specification 
tests for residual autocorrelation and unit roots. These are: Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain. 
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column (1). The differences are large. After ten years, an additional euro of public investment 
spending generates €5.25 in additional output in the coordinated case but only between €3.71 and 
€4.14 in the uncoordinated case. It is no coincidence that these uncoordinated multipliers are similar 
to investment multipliers for individual countries in the existing literature. Studies for individual EU 
countries deal with very open economies where a significant amount of additional spending ends up 
as imports and thus will not stimulate the domestic economy. Analysing the EU27 as a whole, as in 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, is methodologically more apt because a focus on individual countries discounts 
positive spillover effects in the form of increased intra-European trade. These results demonstrate 
the significant benefits of fiscal policy coordination in an integrated economy like the European 
Union. Already large multipliers of public investment tend to become even larger if public investment 
is increased as part of a coordinated fiscal effort. This is an important lesson not only for the task of 
tackling the climate crisis but also for fiscal policy in Europe in general. 
6 Conclusion 
This policy study assesses the long-run effects of a public investment initiative to close the EU’s green 
investment gap. By using semi-structural VAR models for the EU27 we produce the following main 
results: first, EU27 long-run multipliers of government investment on GDP are large. The estimates 
obtained in this study start at 0.56 on impact, increase to between 2.7 and 4.15 after a year and 
stabilise between 5.12 and 5.25 after ten years. This means an additional euro in government 
investment will lead to additional GDP of €5 after ten years. Finding large effects of government 
investment is in line with the existing economic literature (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Leduc 
and Wilson 2012; Benetrix and Lane 2009; Baxter and King 1993). Moreover, these results are 
obtained on the basis of EU27 data and can thus be interpreted as the effects in a large, closed 
economy in contrast to a small open economy in which multipliers decline with openness to trade. 
Second, additional investment spending is likely to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios in the EU27, especially 
at longer horizons. Since a decline in debt-to-GDP ratios implies that governments need to spend a 
smaller proportion of their revenues on debt servicing costs, additional government investment 
expenditure can be regarded as sustainable fiscal policy. This outcome is obtained before factoring 
in the benefits of such investment projects (eg, lower carbon emissions). Third, a government 
investment initiative consisting of an exogenous increase in public investment spending over five years 
produces a significant economic impulse. Public finances are considerably better off after ten years 
when the budgetary response is modelled proportionally to economic expansion at a fixed 30% rate, 
and are slightly better off after ten years when the budgetary response is fully endogenised by 
explicitly modelling the dynamics of the public debt stock. Fourth, by comparing GDP multipliers from 
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a model estimated with aggregate data for the EU27 with multipliers obtained by averaging results 
from models estimated with individual EU member state data, we can quantify the effects of 
coordinating fiscal policy. We find that multipliers based on EU-wide expansions of public 
investment spending are substantially larger than multipliers obtained from investment spending 
expansions in individual countries. We interpret this finding as evidence that coordinating fiscal policy 
in the European Union would produce a larger economic stimulus and thus would ease fiscal 
sustainability concerns even more. Nevertheless, even with uncoordinated fiscal efforts, GDP 
multipliers are large ranging from 0.51 on impact to 4.14 after ten years. Fifth, the results and 
especially the GDP multipliers are very robust and are consistent across our two model 
specifications. The key difference between the specifications is whether government revenues are 
modelled as a fixed proportion of GDP (30%) or whether the stock of public debt is explicitly included 
in the model. Sixth, while the government investment multipliers in this study are based on general 
public investment spending, the extent to which public investment indeed helps to cut carbon 
emissions specifically depends on the chosen investment projects. This means a successful green 
transition requires a strong focus on investment projects that will lead to actual long-term emission 
reductions.  
Based on these results we derive three policy recommendations. The first is to ‘go big’. Following the 
approach of the Biden administration in the USA (and China’s approach to fiscal policy in response to 
the financial crisis), spending large amounts to address the EU’s green investment gap is unlikely to 
create debt sustainability problems in the EU27. By contrast, however, underinvesting due to an overly 
pessimistic assessment of the effects of fiscal policy risks not only missing key climate targets but also 
risks leaving public finances in a worse state. The second policy recommendation is to work together. 
Substantially larger fiscal multipliers for EU-wide expansions of public investment spending highlight 
the benefits and potential gains from coordinated action across member states. This means that a 
pursuit of what are perceived as ‘national’ interests by individual member states has the potential to 
leave everybody worse off than if a coordinated approach is pursued. The third policy 
recommendation is to free investment spending from excessive regulatory constraints. The large 
investment multipliers that we find in this study imply that any attempt to improve public finances by 
cutting government investment spending is highly counterproductive. In the long term, debt-to-GDP 
ratios would then be likely to rise. This is an important lesson which should be incorporated into the 
EU’s fiscal rule book. A significant first step would be to exclude investment expenditure from the 
calculation of the Maastricht budget deficit and of the fiscal compact. The striking result of our policy 
study is that cutting or abstaining from government investment appears to be counterproductive even 
before taking into account non-economic effects such as reductions in carbon intensity.  
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Finally, we are aware that these results might be surprising and counterintuitive to some readers. 
Indeed, we think that the mechanism at work here is the paradox of thrift, applied to the government 
sector. This paradox is an important insight that many macroeconomists seem to have forgotten 
between the 1980s and the financial crisis. Nevertheless, since governments are large in relation to 
the economy, any attempt to spend more (or less) has considerable knock-on effects via the multiplier 
mechanism. The multiplier mechanism thus produces results for an economy which would not hold 
for a small actor such as an individual firm or household. It is therefore ill-advised to apply to the 
government sector the same ideas of ‘prudence’ or ‘financial responsibility’ that might be desirable 
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1 Introduction
This appendix outlines the VAR model and the data which was used to produce the results
of the main document. Most importantly it provides an exact definition of the key concepts
such as the long run multipliers (LRMs), the cumulative impulse response functions
(CIRFs) and the semi-permanent impulse response functions (SPIRFs). The appendix
also outlines how long run multipliers were averaged across EU27 member states and provides
a brief derivation of the standard law of motion for government debt used in section 2 of the
main report.
2 Data
The results are based on quarterly data for government investment spending (GINV )1, output
(GDP )2 and the stock of government debt (GDEBT )3. All three series have been obtained
1Gross fixed capital formation for the general government sector from Eurostat table gov 10q ggnfa
2From Eurostat table namq 10 gdp in chain linked volumes.
3General government consolidated gross debt from Eurostat table gov 10q ggdebt
1
from Eurostat, where possible already seasonally and calendar adjusted, and deflated with the
implicit GDP deflator. The GINV and GDEBT series were seasonally and calendar adjusted
with Python’s statsmodels x13 package. The quarterly GDP and GINV series were transformed
into annualized rates (i.e. multiplied by 4) to achieve easier comparison with annual data. All
three series are plotted for the EU27 below.
Figure 1: EU27 real GINV and real GDP (chain linked volumes)
Figure 2: EU27 real GDEBT and real GDP (chain linked volumes)
3 The modelling and identification approach
We are working with a structural VAR model of the following form:
B0yt = B1yt−1 + · · · +Bpyt−p +m0 +m1t+
s∑
i=1
m2,iSi + ωt (1)
2
where p is the lag length, yt is a vector of K endogenous variables of the dimensions K × 1, the
B matrices are K × K coefficient matrics, m0 is a K × 1 vector of constants, m1 is a K × 1
vector of time trends and m2,i are a K×K coefficient matrices for s step indicators represented
by the K × 1 vectors Si. We use two models, in the first K = 2 and yt = [gt, xt]′ and in the
second K = 3 and yt = [gt, xt, dt]
′ where gt is government investment spending, xt is GDP
and dt is the stock of government debt. All variables are deflated by the GDP deflator and in
logarithms. We will discuss identification first and then introduce the step indicator approach.
3.1 Identification approach
The contemporaneous effects matrix B0 is of a lower triangular form (for the three variable
case):
B0 =
c11 0 0c21 c22 0
c31 c32 c33
 (2)
Our identification approach relies on one main assumption which is that government investment
does not react within the period to either GDP or government debt. Which means we order the





Since we are only interested in the causal effects of government investment spending (gt) but
do not attempt to identify other demand or supply shocks or shocks to government debt, the
ordering of the remaining variables in the system does not affect the government investment
impulse response functions.
3.2 Step Indicators
The significant slowdown of the trend growth rate after the 2009 financial crises and the 2012
Euro crisis, is not just a temporary deviation from an otherwise unchanged long term trend
(captured by the included time trends). This phenomenon has received substantial attention
in the literature where it was discussed under the labels of secular stagnation, hysteresis and
austerity. In order to strike a balance between keeping the model relatively simple and track-
able while being required to take this crisis of historic proportion into account, we model these
crises as exogenous events by incorporating step-indicator saturation as discussed by Castle et al.
(2015). The idea of step indicator saturation is to saturate the model with step indicators Si for
each quarter t where St is equal to 1 from the first quarter up to quarter t and zero afterwards:
St = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
, 0, . . . , 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T-t times
(4)
This means step indicator St allows for a permanent shift (i.e. a step) in the time series. The
estimated coefficient matrix m2,s determines the sign and size of this shift for each of the K
endogenous variables. We estimate the model by including 1 step indicator and then re-estimate
it with the next step indicator. We repeat this process for all T − 1 step indicators. The finally
selected model is estimated with those step indicators which are statistically significant at the
1% level and up to a maximum of 7 step indicators (10% of the sample).
3
4 Investment spending policy shocks
The MA representation of the model is given by:














where ypt is the particular solution or the steady state of the system, Θi = φiB
−1
0 and φi = JA
iJ ′
where A is the companion matrix of the VAR(p) process (Kilian & Lütkepohl 2017, p. 25). The
Θi matrices are K ×K with elements θjk,i where j indicates the row and k the column. This
means we have an MA representation in the structural shocks ωt rather than the reduced form
errors ut. The structural impulse response function (SIRF) to a one off (temporary) structural
shock is given as:
∂yj,t
∂ωk,0
= SIRFjk,t = θjk,t (6)
Therefore θjk,t gives the deviation from the steady state or particular solution of variable j, t
periods after a structural shock ω hit variable k in period 0. We can calculate the cumulative











θjk,i = C-SIRF∞ (8)
Thus we can use the C-SIRF to compute the effect of a permanent exogenous change in in-
vestment spending (mg,0), for example due to a policy change, on the steady state (particular
solution) of the system. Overall the SIRF enables us to trace the effect of a one-off or temporary
shock through the system and the C-SIRF enables us to trace the effect of a permanent shock
through the system. What is less straightforward is how to trace a shock through the system
which occurs for more than 1 period but is not permanent. In the next section we will combine
C-SIRFs to do that.
5 Semi-permanent structural IRFs (SP-SIRF)
Let’s say we want to track the effect of a shock to variable k on variable j and let’s assume this
shock lasts for a specific number (l) of periods. First, we can rely on the C-SIRFs to calcualte
the deviation from the steady up to period l. From period l + 1 onward the shock recedes and
the endogenous adjustment back to the steady state begins. We can track the full adjustment










θjk,j = C-SIRFjk,t−C-SIRFjk,t−l−1 = SP-SIRFjk,t (9)
4
and we will call it a semi-permanent structural impulse response function (SP-SIRF). The for-
mula for calculating SP-SIRFs can be derived from using the MA representation yt − ypt =∑∞
i=0 Θiωt−i and plugging in a specific sequence of shocks such as (. . . , 0, 0, 0, ω0, ω1, . . . , ωl, 0, 0, . . . )
and collecting terms.
6 Marginal effects and multipliers
In the example of fiscal policy, we are interested in linking the size of the impulse and the
endogenous response of the fiscal instrument to the size of the output response triggered by
the fiscal impulse. Fiscal multipliers are a way of achieving exactly that by condensing this
relationship into a single number. If the data vector yt consists of or contains time series in
logarithms, the IRFs represent elasticities or percentage deviations from the steady state. In
this context prior to calculating fiscal multipliers, these elasticities need to be transformed into
marginal effects. IRFs expressed in marginal effects (ME) represent the deviations from the
steady state of variable j not in percentages but in levels. For this purpose it is common in the
fiscal multiplier literature Ramey (2019), Gechert et al. (2021) to multiply the SIRFs with the
sample mean of the underlying response variable j. Alternatively the sample end, or start or
any other period could be used instead of the sample average:
MEjk,t = ȳjθjk,t (10)
In our application the marginal effect of a one standard deviation shock to government invest-
ment spending (g, the k-varible) on GDP (x, the j variable) is:
MExg,t = x̄θxg,t
MExg,t is given in the units of measurement of x which are billion Euros. The cumulative fiscal






which is the ratio between the total deviation of GDP from the steady state and the total
deviations of the fiscal variable from steady state in response to a permanent increase in the
fiscal variable.
7 Coordinated and uncoordinated fiscal policy
We have aggregate data for the EU27 and in addition data for all 27 member states individually.
This allows us to compare the effectiveness of fiscal policy between periods of coordinated (or
simultaneous) expansions and periods of isolated expansions. For this purpose we calculate the
cumulative fiscal multiplier based on aggregate EU27 data and label it as:
CFMEU27t (12)
This multiplier can be interpreted as a measure of fiscal policy effectiveness based on simultane-
ous fiscal expansions in the EU27. We can compare that with country specific fiscal multipliers
based on individual country data:
CFM ct
where c = (AT, . . . ,SK). CFM ct represents the effectiveness of fiscal policy in country c based
on an isolated fiscal expansion in country c. In order to compare the effects of isolated or
uncoordinated fiscal expansions we summarise the 27 individual multipliers in order to easily
5
compare them to CFMEU27t . The first way of summarising them is to calculate a GDP weighted













t because it will slightly deviate from
x27t due to the non-summability of national accounts data in chained volume indeces. The second














The first approach is more intuitive because it is a simple (GDP-weighted) average across 20
individual fiscal multipliers. The second approach is more accurate because it correctly adds up
the deviations from the particular solutions for each country and only as the last step takes the
ratio. We report both approaches, the results are qualitatively similar.
8 A law of motion for government debt
In order to derive a simple law of motion for government debt we start by defining government
debt B(t) as well as real GDP Y (t) as functions of time. Further we define the debt to GDP
















variables with dots represents derivatives of these variables with respect to time and ŷ is the
growth rate of real GDP. Next we will make use of the following accounting identity:
Ḃ = E − T + iB (16)
where E-T is the primary deficit and i is the current interest rate on government debt. It states
that the change in government debt Ḃ, is equal to the primary budget deficit plus the interest
rate payments on the outstanding public liabilities. Combining equations (15) and (16) yields:
ḃ = (e− t) + (i− ŷ)b (17)
where g-t is the primary deficit in percent of GDP and (i− ŷ) is the difference between the real
interest rate and real output growth rate4. The stability of this differential equation is given iff:
∂ḃ
∂b
= (i− ŷ) < 0 (18)





As discussed in the main text, this way of looking at public sector dynamics ignores any feedback
from government spending E on output Y itself. Thus this law of motion is at best a crude
long run rule of thumb if one is prepared to assume that the growth of the economy is driven
by factors such as demographis or technological change with themselves are not affected by
government spending.
4The discrete time version of this equation becomes ∆bt = (e− t) + (i− g)bt where g = ∆YY is the growth rate
of output. This is equivalent to equation (1) in the main text.
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